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Economic Mobility, Family Background, and the 
Well-Being of Children in the United States and Canada
* 
 
This comparative study of the relationship between family economic background and adult 
outcomes in the United States and Canada addresses three questions. First, is there 
something to explain? We suggest that the existing literature finds that there are significant 
differences in the degree of intergenerational economic mobility between these two countries, 
relative mobility being lower in the United States. This is the result of lower mobility at the 
very top and the very bottom of the earnings distribution. Second, does this reflect different 
underlying values of the citizens in these countries? Findings from comparable public opinion 
polls suggest that this is not the case. The citizens of both countries have a similar 
understanding of a successful life, one that is rooted in individual aspirations and freedom. 
They also have similar views on how these goals should be attained, but with one important 
exception: Americans differ in that they are more likely to see the State hindering rather than 
helping the attainment of these goals. Finally, how do the investments these countries make 
in the future of their children through the family, the labour market, and public policy actually 
differ? Using a number of representative household surveys we find that the configuration of 
all three sources of investment and support for children differs significantly, disadvantaged 
American children living in much more challenging circumstances, and the role of public 
policy not as strong in determining outcomes. 
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In the United States there is a long social science tradition recognizing the value of a federal 
structure in developing effective public policies. Significant variations in public programs 
across States offers opportunities for learning about what works and what doesn’t, and hence 
for the refinement of policy goals and improvements in program implementation. Our 
comparative study of the relationship between family economic background and adult 
outcomes in the United States and Canada is offered in this spirit, by extending the scope of 
the comparison across countries it offers another dimension for understanding the nature of 
social goals, and how different institutional contexts play out in attaining them. 
 
There are important similarities and differences between these two countries. The starting 
point for our analysis is the difference in outcomes that has been observed in the empirical 
economics literature dealing with economic mobility across the generations. International 
comparisons of the average degree of generational earnings mobility suggest that Canada is 
more mobile than the United States, but a closer look at studies that use particularly high 
quality data that are directly comparable across this pair of countries suggests that the 
difference is even larger than implied by the broad international literature. On average 
Canada is up to three times more mobile than the United States. Or another way of putting it, 
up to three times as much inequality is passed across the generations in the United States 
than in Canada. Furthermore, these differences arise from differences in the extremes of the 
earnings distribution: there is notably less mobility at the very top and the very bottom of the 
American income ladder. For this reason we focus our more detailed comparative analysis 
not just on the average child but also on the relatively disadvantaged, and try to chart the 
prospects for upward mobility in these two countries. 
 
These cross-country differences in outcomes are not a reflection of different societal 
preferences, or interpretations of the meaning of equality of opportunity. In fact, it is valuable 
to compare these two particular relatively rich countries because they are so much alike. This 
similarity in public attitudes is confirmed in the comparative public opinion polls conducted 
and reported upon. Both countries value the ideal of equality of opportunity, and both define it 
in terms of individual freedoms but also individual responsibilities. Americans, however, are 
more inclined to view government as doing more to hinder than help this process. Yet, at the 
same time the citizens of both countries recognize the need for public policy to contribute to 
reaching this ideal, with Americans believing more than Canadians that a whole host of 
interventions would be effective in improving the prospects for economic mobility. One 
interpretation of these findings – an interpretation that only becomes evident in a comparative 
context – is that in some sense this need is going unmet in the United States. 
 
This is reflected in the actual resources available to children. We offer a descriptive overview 
of these resources organized loosely around a model of intergenerational economic mobility 
that highlights the role of families, labour markets, and public policies as together determining 
the degree of mobility and explaining differences between jurisdictions. The family context in 
which children are raised in the United States is more challenging than in Canada, raising the 
risks that some children will not see the full development of their capabilities. American 
labour markets are also more unequal raising the stakes for child outcomes, both elevating 
opportunities and heightening risks. Finally, public policy is less “progressive,” not 
compensating in the same degree for family background and labour market inequality. 
 
The portrait we paint of young children across these three dimensions underscores the fact 
that childhood outcomes differ for children before they reach their teen years, and potentially 
set them down pathways that will lead to different adult outcomes. Mental and physical 
health, school readiness, and some education outcomes are all more developed in Canada. 
But this portrait also highlights some particularly relevant institutional differences in public 
policy between the countries that merit closer attention as the underlying causes. 
 The first concerns health care. The universal provision of accessible health care in Canada 
plays a role in the preventative care of children, reducing the number and severity of health 
shocks that could potentially lead to more severe difficulties. But in both countries issues of 
access are also more subtle, associated with economic and social barriers limiting visits to 
health care providers, ability to pay for prescriptions, and knowledge as to how to navigate 
the health care system. The anecdotal evidence provided by Scott (2005) with respect to the 
ability of adults to access and respond to care providers in the United States probably rings 
true for children on both sides of the border. 
 
The second concerns the flexibility that parents have in making child care choices and 
deciding upon hours of work. The two countries have very different policies that offer different 
opportunities for parents in balancing the demands of family and workplace, particularly in the 
early years of a child's life. Canadian mothers and fathers would appear to have more 
flexibility as a result of significant policy changes in the mid 1990s that extended paid leave 
during the year after a child's birth as well as the legislative right to return to their jobs. There 
seems also to be more use of part-time employment. In the United States the limited nature 
of parental leave leads to a polarization in family decisions, with relatively well-off families 
able to either afford private child care or to have the mother withdraw from the labour market, 
while at the other extreme lone mothers have fewer options and are much more likely to 
continue working. This discussion leaves aside important issues of the quality of the care 
arrangements, an area of continued research. 
 
The third deals with labour market inequalities and the role of tax-transfer programs. Left to 
their own, labour markets lead to roughly the same level of income poverty in these two 
countries, though there is more affluence on average in the United States and greater 
inequality. While the average Canadian child is not as affluent as the average American, the 
poorest Canadian is not as poor in an absolute sense as Americans at the bottom of the 
income distribution. Public income transfers play a much more important role in reducing 
poverty among Canadian children with virtually all families receiving some measure of public 
support. This is likely the result of the Canadian Child Tax Benefit, a progressive system of 
income transfers delivered through the income tax system with the generosity of the benefit 
varying with family market income and number of children. While this program has played a 
limited role in reducing the incidence of low income, it has significantly reduced the severity 
of poverty. This design contrasts with the Employment Income Tax Benefit in the United 
States, which is tied to employment. All this said our analysis has not accounted for the role 
of in-kind transfers in the United States, nor analysed the relative merits of targeted in-kind 
support versus broad-based money transfers. These alternative delivery mechanisms need 
to be evaluated not only in terms of the level of support they offer, but once again with 
respect to more subtle issues of access, stigma, and take-up rates. 
 
Finally, our analysis highlights but leaves unaddressed important details concerning the 
quality and the variation in quality of public schooling. As suggested the financing of public 
education is very different across these countries. Education is a provincial responsibility in 
Canada, much in the way that the States have primary responsibility in the United States. But 
the financial resources available to schools are not linked to local property taxes, being tied 
rather to the province-wide income tax. This permits a more equal allocation of resources 
across municipalities and neighbourhoods than the United States, and may contribute to a 
higher overall level of quality that is ultimately reflected in the higher test score outcomes we 
document for Canadian children just before their entry to high school. 
 
It is important to re-emphasize that much of our analysis refers to a particular cohort of young 
people, those who were young teens at the turn of the century and who will soon be coming 
of age as adults. Demographics, labour markets, and public policy have all changed 
significantly over the course of the last decade. These changes may have a bearing on how 
younger cohorts of children will fare as adults. But given the configuration of these forces 
during the period relevant for the cohort we study, essentially the 1990s and early 2000s, our 
analysis suggests that the next wave of intergenerational mobility studies – which will be based on this very group – will likely find that the degree of mobility continues to remain 
greater in Canada than in the United States. 
 
All this said, to some measure the observation that Alesina and Glaeser (2004) make in 
beginning their explanation for the much smaller size of the welfare state in the United States 
compared to Europe also holds when the comparison is made to Canada: “If one were born 
(and remained) at the bottom end of the income distribution, one would be much better taken 
care of by government policies in Europe than by those in the United States.” (Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004, page 2.) But their explanation for different levels of government support is not 
so easily transposed to the Canadian context. “American institutions [they argue] have 
strengthened the political right and given anti-redistribution politicians the ability to push their 
world view – and this world view emphasizes economic opportunity. European institutions, to 
the contrary, have empowered the left; as a result, leftist leaders have been able to 
indoctrinate Europeans with Marxist ideals about class solidarity and the capriciousness of 
the capitalist system.” (page 12.) 
 
This sharp dichotomy between values and institutions that pit equality of opportunity against 
equality of outcomes does not resonate in a comparison involving the United States and 
Canada. Our analysis has shown that Canadians value equality of opportunity no more and 
no less than Americans, and they have as much aversion for equality of outcomes. But 
Canadians have drawn the balance between family and labour markets differently than 
Americans – using in a pragmatic way the instruments available through public policy – and 
for this reason the tie between family background and the adult outcomes of children will 
likely to continue to be looser in Canada for at least another generation. 1 Introduction
The United States and Canada share a good deal in common, making them
arguably the two most similar countries in the OECD. Not least of these sim-
ilarities is a common perspective that informs and de￿nes the self-image and
social goals of their citizens, whose histories and cultures have been shaped by
newcomers seeking opportunities and better lives. The idea of ￿equality of op-
portunity￿ in which inherited aspects of family background play a second role
to individual motivation, talents, and energy in determining economic success
is an important part of this common heritage, and makes ￿land of opportunity￿
a common de￿ning metaphor.
Yet there are very important di￿erences in economic outcomes on the two
sides of the 49th parallel. The United States is richer, with a per capita income
in 2007 that is almost 20 percent higher than in Canada (OECD 2009). But it
is also more unequal. In the United States households ranking at the top decile
of the income distribution have almost six times as much as those at the bottom
decile, a ratio that is the third highest among 30 OECD countries. In Canada
this ratio is just over four, essentially at the OECD average and 18th among
the 30 countries (OECD 2008, Table 1.A2.2, page 51).
The research literature directed to an understanding of these similarities
and di￿erences has a long history, with a notable starting point being the work
of Seymour Martin Lipset who studied the much stronger tendency for col-
lective action in Canada, and attempted to understand the rise of ￿agrarian
socialism￿ as o￿ering support for social democratic political parties, parties
that were and continue to be absent in the United States (Lipset 1950). This
established political-sociology literature extends through the work of Esping-
Andersen (1990), Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and others. But there have also
been numerous studies on social and economic outcomes, with perhaps the most
comprehensive collected in an edited volume under the title Small Di￿erences
that Matter (Card and Freeman 1993).
Our research addresses one di￿erence that has been uncovered since the
publication of this book in the early 1990s, that economic mobility across the
generations￿the tie between family economic background and the adult attain-
ments of children￿is not the same between these countries. This fact has drawn
a certain amount of attention as it informs public policy concerns about equality
of opportunity, the functioning of the labour market, as well as policies dealing
with education, health care, immigration, and support to families with children
(Haskins and Sawhill 2009, New York Times 2005, Sawhill and Morton 2008,
Wessel 2005).
A general consensus has developed in the applied economics literature that
relative mobility of earnings across the generations is greater in Canada than
in the United States. On average, Americans are much more likely to occupy
the same place in the earnings distribution as their parents than Canadians.
The most common indicator of the degree to which relative inequality is passed
on across the generations is the intergenerational earnings elasticity between
fathers and sons: the percentage change in a child’s adult earnings for each
2percentage change in the father’s permanent earnings. This has been measured
to be about 0.4 to as high as 0.6 in the United States in the most recent wave
of research since the in￿uential work of Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992).
In Canada, this same measure is often cited as being less than half as great, in
the neighbourhood of 0.2 or so, implying that less than one-￿fth of an earnings
advantage is passed on across the generations compared to about one-half or
more in the United States.
Our analysis takes these overall average indicators of the degree of stickiness
between family background and the adult economic outcomes of children as its
starting point. One way of appreciating the underlying reasons for any particular
level of generational mobility in a country is to focus on changes over time, as
for example in Aaronson and Mazumder (2008), Lee and Solon (2009), Mayer
and Lopoo (2004), Mulligan (1997), and Reville (1995) for the United States,
and Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) in Canada. But another way is to focus on
changes across space, that is, on cross-country di￿erences. Our research method
is predicated on the idea that the Canada-US comparison is an analytically
valuable one to make because of the degree of similarity in many features of these
societies, and because of the availability of relatively comparable data. As such a
cross-country comparison can complement analyses across time within countries
in not only highlighting di￿erences between the countries, but also possible
causal mechanisms and particularly the role of public policy in determining the
overall degree of generational mobility within a country.
The research summarized in this chapter proceeds by addressing three ques-
tions. Is there something to explain? If there is, does it re￿ect di￿erences in
values and the meaning of the social goals they underlie? And ￿nally, if values
associated with the meaning of equality of opportunity are the same, then are
there di￿erences in the investments made in children that could account for the
di￿erent outcomes?
We summarize and document the ￿ndings in the existing literature that
there are signi￿cant di￿erences in the degree of intergenerational economic mo-
bility between these two countries, with the United States characterized by a
signi￿cantly lower average degree of relative mobility. Our review suggests that
these di￿erences are not due to di￿erences in measurement, analytical meth-
ods, or underlying data instruments. Rather they re￿ect the fact that family
background is more strongly related to the adult outcomes of children￿that
intergenerational mobility is lower￿at the very top and the very bottom of the
earnings distribution in the United States.
Findings from comparable public opinion polls suggest that these di￿erences
cannot be characterized as being the result of fundamentally di￿erent values
over the meaning of equality of opportunity, and hence di￿erent social choices
that in some sense are optimal for each country. The citizens of both countries
have a very similar sense of the meaning of a good and successful life, one that
is rooted in individual aspirations and freedom. They also have similar views on
how these goals should be attained with individual attributes like hard work and
human capital accumulation being central. But there is an important exception.
Americans di￿er from Canadians in that they are more likely to see government
3hindering rather than helping the attainment of these goals.
These two countries draw di￿erent boundaries between the roles of family,
market, and the public sector in investing in the capacities of children. Using a
number of representative household surveys we ￿nd that the con￿guration of all
three sources of investment and support for children di￿ers signi￿cantly, with
disadvantaged children living in much more challenging familial circumstances
in the United States, with their parents having more di￿culty in maintaining a
strong foothold in labour markets characterized by greater inequalities, and the
role of the welfare state not as strong in determining their outcomes.
2 Comparable estimates of earnings mobility
across the generations
The empirical framework for the measurement of the degree of intergenerational
earnings mobility is in large part informed by the following equation.
Yi;t =  + Yi;t 1 + i;t (1)
Y represents the outcome of interest, generally earnings or permanent income
measured in natural logarithms, i indexes families, and t indexes generations.
As such, the adult earnings of a child from a particular family, Y i;t, is related to
the average earnings of the members of a similar age cohort, , plus a deviation
from the average that consists of two parts. The ￿rst part re￿ects the fraction of
parental advantage inherited by the child, as indicated by Y i;t 1; the second,
i;t re￿ects all other in￿uences not correlated with parental earnings.
This is an exercise in description, not causation. The empirical challenge is
to obtain an accurate estimate of , which represents, when earnings are mea-
sured in natural logarithms, the intergenerational elasticity of earnings. This
is an overall average indicator of the degree to which inequality is transmitted
across the generations, and as such might be an interesting statistic to describe
an economy, much in the way that the Gini coe￿cient is used to summarize
inequality at a point in time.
The intergenerational elasticity, however, is more challenging to estimate
than the Gini coe￿cient, the ideal data being developed from a longitudinal
study of a large, nationally representative sample of individuals and families.
These individuals and families must be followed for a period long enough to
obtain a credible estimate of the permanent income available to the parents
while the child is growing up, and long enough to observe the child in adulthood
at a roughly similar stage in the life cycle as his or parents. In practice the
nature of the data available across countries di￿ers, and therefore the extent to
which measurement errors associated with the calculation of permanent income
will also di￿er, as will the representativeness and size of the available sample.
Corak (2006) points out that a comprehensive reading of the available empirical
literature would not lead to any substantive conclusions about the relative size of
 across countries if no account were taken of how the measurement and life cycle
4Figure 1: Comparable estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of earnings



























Source: Adapted and updated with information for Italy, Spain and Australia
from Corak (2006), Table 1 and Piraino (2007), Cervini (2009), and Leigh
(2007).
errors outlined by Solon (1992), Zimmerman (1992), Grawe (2006), and Haider
and Solon (2006) are addressed. Not all studies are created equal in this regard,
and the derivation of robust and comparable estimates of the intergenerational
elasticity must take this into account before drawing any conclusions.
A set of international comparable estimates drawn from this literature that
recognizes di￿erences in study designs is o￿ered in Figure 1. These estimates
are not meant as de￿nitive for each country, but rather as the best estimates
suitable for international comparisons. Further, they refer exclusively to the
elasticity between father and son earnings, the literature on both parents and
on daughters still being too sparse. The United States is among the least mobile
countries in this group; Canada among the most mobile. The meta analysis of
the literature upon which these ￿ndings are based could reasonably suggest a
range of estimates for the United States of between 0.40 at the low end to 0.52 at
the upper end. But this still is outside a comparable set of bounds for Canada,
which range from 0.16 to 0.21 (Corak 2006, Table 1, page 152).
A more de￿nitive estimate of the intergenerational elasticity in father-son
5earnings for the United States is o￿ered by Mazumder (2005, 2004). There
are many studies estimating this statistic, and the very strong majority are
based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Indeed, to some im-
portant degree the rebirth of this empirical literature in the early 1990s was
due to the availability of su￿ciently long panels of information in this data
set. But the drawback is that only rather small analytical samples can be
constructed for intergenerational studies, measuring roughly in the couple of
hundreds. Mazumder’s research is distinguished by the development of a new
data set involving a linkage between survey data and administrative data on
earnings.1 His analysis of samples that are six to eight times as large as those
available through the PSID￿roughly 1,300 to 1,600 father-son pairs￿coupled
with higher quality earnings data for parents that span up to 15 years leads to
an estimate of the intergenerational elasticity of earnings between fathers and
sons as high as 0.613, with an associated standard error of 0.096 (Mazumder
2005, Table 7, page 248).
The nature of the data and the age cohorts used in this study make it directly
comparable to the Canadian. Corak and Heisz (1999) use administrative data
associated with the Canadian income tax system to obtain earnings for a sample
of about 340,000 father and son pairs. Using paternal earnings over a ￿ve year
period they estimate the intergenerational elasticity to be 0.23 with a standard
error of 0.003 (Corak and Heisz 1999, Table 3, page 513).
What is striking, however, is that the sample selection rules used in these
two studies are very close to being the same. Mazumder (2005, 2004) examines
a young cohort of men age 15 to 20 in 1983￿being born between 1963 and
1968￿and who were living with their parents in that year. These young men
were at least 27 years of age when their earnings are measured in 1995 to 1998.
Corak and Heisz (1999) examine a cohort of men age 16 to 19 in 1982￿being
born between 1963 and 1966￿who ￿led an income tax return while living at
home between 1982 and 1986. These young men were at least 27 years of age
when their earnings are measured between 1993 and 1995.
On this basis the di￿erence in the degree of relative intergenerational mo-
bility is higher than suggested by Figure 1, being about three times as great
in Canada as in the United States. 2 Just as importantly, however, these two
studies are based on su￿ciently large sample sizes to permit analyses of di￿er-
ences in mobility at di￿erent points in the parental earnings distribution. Both
studies present decile transition matrices showing that these large di￿erences
1He links the Survey of Income and Program Participation to Social Security Administra-
tion Summary Earnings Data, o￿ering high quality earnings information on up to 1,600 father
and son pairs.
2These di￿erences in the intergenerational elasticities are not due to demographic di￿er-
ences associated, for example, with immigration. It is generally recognized that immigration
policies have di￿ered for some time, with the United States more likely to accept low-skilled
immigrants and with a signi￿cant fraction of illegal immigrants while Canada is inclined to
select high-skilled immigrants. Studies of the intergenerational mobility of immigrants in both
countries have found that the father-son earnings elasticities are no di￿erent than for the over-
all population: ranging from 0.4 to 0.6 in the United States, and essentially 0.2 in Canada.
See Card, DiNardo and Estes (2000) and Aydemir, Chen, and Corak (2009).












Source: Corak and Heisz (1999), Table 6, page 520; Mazumder (2004), Table
2.2, page 93.












Source: Corak and Heisz (1999), Table 6, page 520; Mazumder (2004), Table
2.2, page 93.
7Figure 4: Upward generational earnings mobility in Canada and the United
States: Chances that sons raised in the bottom half of the earnings distribution





























































































Source: Corak and Heisz (1999), Table 6, page 520; Mazumder (2004), Table
2.2, page 93.
in average mobility are due to di￿erences at the extremes of the distribution.
These are summarized in Figures 2 and 3 for sons born respectively to top decile
and bottom decile fathers.
Of the sons born to fathers whose earnings places them among the top ten
percent of earners in their distribution over one-quarter (26 percent) grow up
to be adults who are also in the top ten percent of their earnings distribution.
It is also notable that these sons are more likely to drop to the very bottom
of their earnings distribution in Canada than in the United States, where 8.4
percent ￿nd themselves in the bottom compared to just 3 percent. If downward
mobility is less likely in the United States, so is upward mobility. Twenty-two
percent of sons born to bottom decile American fathers remain in the bottom
as adults, and a further 18 percent only move up one decile. In Canada just
under 16 percent (15.8) remain in the bottom with 14 percent moving up only
one decile.3
3These ￿ndings also suggest that Canada has more in common with Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden￿countries with arguably the highest levels of social expenditure as a
8Figure 4 summarizes the extent of upward mobility in these countries by con-
trasting the chances that a son born to a father in the bottom half of the earnings
distribution will move to the top half. While the chances of this happening for
those born to fathers just below the median, in the fourth or ￿fth deciles, are
similar in the two countries￿around 50 percent for an upward movement of
one or two deciles￿they are noticeably higher in Canada at lower deciles. The
probability that a bottom decile Canadian son will have adult earnings placing
him in the top half of his earnings distribution is 0.38, but for a comparable
American this is 0.30. In fact, a son raised in the bottom decile in Canada has
about the same chances of reaching the top half of the earnings distribution as
a third decile son in the United States.
3 Economic mobility and equality of opportunity
While these di￿erences in generational economic mobility are signi￿cant, both
in a substantive and a statistical sense, they do not necessarily imply di￿erences
in equality of opportunity. Jencks and Tach (2006) and Roemer (2004) address
this issue, pointing out in particular that complete equality of opportunity is
not indicated by an intergenerational elasticity of zero, or entries in a transition
matrix that are all the same. In this sense it is not as if Canada is further along
in some optimal sense than the United States. The existing di￿erences could
very well be optimal for each country, re￿ecting underlying values and the social
choices that respect them.
Roemer (2004) is particularly clear on this point. At the risk of over-
simplifying his argument, he de￿nes equality of opportunity as follows: ￿Equal-
ity of opportunity ... views inequities of outcome as indefensible, ethically speak-
ing, when and only when they are due to di￿erential circumstances.￿ (Roemer
2004, page 50.) The issue, of course is how to de￿ne ￿circumstances.￿ Children
resemble their parents for all kinds of reasons, some of which tend to be persis-
tently rewarded in the labour market. To paraphrase Roemer, there are three
successively broader ￿elds, or circumstances, that would give rise to successively
broader de￿nitions of equality of opportunity and hence state intervention.
At one extreme is the in￿uence of social connections and family income
in facilitating access to important resources that in￿uence capabilities and the
chances children succeed. Roemer suggests that most citizens in the rich coun-
tries might agree with the notion that equality of opportunity would be pro-
moted if the in￿uence of inherited wealth, connections, and outright nepotism
in determining access to health care, education and jobs were eliminated.
percent of GDP in the OECD￿than they with the United States. In comparing the United
States to the United Kingdom and these Nordic countries Jantti et al. (2006, page 2) observe
that ￿what distinguishes the pattern of male intergenerational mobility in the U.S. ... is the
low upwards mobility for sons from low income families in the United States.￿ Their results
are based on quintile transition matrices, and though not directly comparable to the ￿ndings
summarized above, are roughly of the same magnitude for the Nordic countries as for Canada.
See their table 12, page 33.
9He also suggests, at the other extreme, that most citizens would disagree
with the suggestion that the in￿uence of inherited ability should be eliminated
in order to promote equality of opportunity. It is notable, after all, that even
the most mobile countries listed in Figure 1 have not completely eliminated the
intergenerational link in earnings.
But between these extremes societies may legitimately make di￿erent choices
concerning the extent to which parent-child correlations in outcomes are in ac-
cord with a level playing ￿eld. Child outcomes are also in￿uenced by the mone-
tary and non-monetary investments parents make in their children, investments
that in￿uence their skills, beliefs, and motivation. These will re￿ect their de-
gree of altruism, and their e￿cacy in translating time and money into long-run
outcomes. Di￿erent sets of values will lead to di￿erent policy recommendations
dealing with the extent of state intervention, and public provision of goods that
compensate or substitute for parental and familial investments of this more
subtle sort.
As such we should be cautious in drawing normative conclusions from ob-
served di￿erences. Policy recommendations cannot be drawn from the sort of
cross-country comparison we have o￿ered without additional information on
social values that give meaning to ￿equality of opportunity,￿ and de￿ne the
legitimate methods to attain it.
For this reason we inform our analysis with two public opinion polls that
address a host of issues related to economic mobility and equality of opportunity.
The ￿rst was conducted for the PEW charitable trusts by Greenberg Quinlan
Rosner Research in late January and early February of 2009; the second adapted
this questionnaire to Canada and was put into the ￿eld in late August and early
September of the same year by EKOS Research Associates. 4
In what follows we report on just three aspects of these polls: (1) a de￿nition
of the ￿American Dream￿ and its association with economic mobility; (2) a
statement of perspectives on the factors that in￿uence economic mobility; and
(3) a description of concerns about inequality, equality of opportunity and the
role of public policy.
In the United States respondents were asked the following question:
The term American Dream means di￿erent things to di￿erent peo-
ple. Here are some ways some people have described what the Amer-
ican dream means to them. On a scale of one to ten, please tell
me how accurately each statement describes what you consider the
4The poll of Americans surveyed 2,119 adults older than 18 years between January 27th
and February 8th, 2009. This was based on random digit dialling with the use of a cell
phone sampling frame for those under 40 years of age, and took an average of 22 minutes to
complete. The poll of Canadians surveyed 1,035 adults 18 and older between August 20th
and September 14th, 2009. This survey was also based upon a strati￿ed random sample
including both land line and cell phone households. The questionnaire was the same as that
used in the American survey to the extent possible. Some questions were adapted, some
added, and everything was also translated to French. It required an average of 29 minutes to
complete. See http://www.economicmobility.org/poll2009 for the questionnaire used in the
United States, and a summary of the major results. The Canadian questionnaire is available
from the authors upon request.
10Figure 5: De￿ning the American Dream in the United States and Canada: Per
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American dream to be. One would mean this statement does not de-
scribe the American Dream at all. A ten would mean this statement
describes the American Dream almost perfectly.
This was the most challenging question to adapt to the Canadian situation, and
it was posed as:
Americans often talk about attaining the American Dream to de-
scribe what it means to have a good life in their country. This means
di￿erent things to di￿erent people. Here are some ways some Amer-
icans have described what the American Dream means to them. On
a scale of one to ten, please tell me how accurately each statement
describes what you would consider the Canadian Dream to be. One
would mean the statement does not describe what it means at all.
A ten would mean the statement describes it perfectly.
The outcomes are very similar, and are presented in Figure 5. 5 The information
in this ￿gure presents the proportion of the sample answering 8 or higher on
a 10 point scale. Americans and Canadians have for the most part the very
same ranking of these alternatives, and indeed in very much to the same degree.
The two options that garner the greatest consensus, in the neighbourhood of
5The 95 percent con￿dence interval for the US survey is +/￿ 3.4 percentage points at sample
proportions of 50 percent, falling to +/￿ 2.0 percent at 10 and 90 percent. These bounds are
similar in Canada, with the 95 percent interval being +/￿ 3.0 percent at a proportion of 50
percent. With respect to this particular question, the option ￿Getting a college degree￿ was
changed in the Canadian version to ￿Getting a university degree.￿
1170 percent, refer to aspects of individual freedom. Aspects of ￿nancial security
follow next with about 60 percent of the samples giving the ￿nancial welfare
of children, ￿nancially security, and house ownership a score of eight or higher
out of ten. Canadians di￿er from Americans in being somewhat more content
with being able to a￿ord a few luxuries, and less inclined to feel strongly about
owning a business. But the general message from this information is that there
are not strong underlying di￿erences in what the good life means, and most
importantly it is associated with individual freedoms.
The citizens of these countries also have similar views concerning the factors
that determine economic mobility. Both Americans and Canadians feel strongly
that individual attributes, like hard work and schooling choices, lead to upward
economic mobility. In both countries factors external to the individual, outside
of his or her control, rank much lower. The same question was posed in both
countries:
Some people use the term ECONOMIC MOBILITY to describe the
ability of individuals to move up or down the income ladder over
a lifetime or from one generation to the next. I am going to read
you a list of factors that may contribute to a person’s economic
mobility, that is, their ability to improve themselves ￿nancially and
get ahead in life. For each one I read, please tell me if this is essential,
very important, somewhat important, not very important or not
important at all?
Figure 6 displays the proportion of respondents that said the factor in question
was essential or very important to upward mobility. Five items in this list
garner this level of support from three-quarters or more of respondents in both
countries, and with the same ranking. All of these refer to personal choices
related to e￿ort or with human capital formation: hard work, having ambition,
staying healthy, quality Kindergarten to Grade 12 education, and more generally
having a good education. ￿Growing up in a stable family￿ also is highly cited,
with over 70 percent of respondents considering it an essential or important
factor in determining economic mobility.
The distinction between factors re￿ecting individual choices and others re-
￿ecting external contexts is admittedly a bit blurred. For example, ￿quality
education￿ is both an individual decision re￿ecting choices about how much
education to receive and at which schools, but also one that is constrained by
social and institutional structures. This said, other factors that are, to varying
degrees, outside of the individual’s control received less support. Though, when
these refer to aspects of family background, and individual characteristics like
race and gender, respondents in the United States are more likely to consider
them essential or very important. Having educated parents, coming from a
wealthy family, gender, and race all rank among the lowest in the entire list,
but with more Americans citing them than Canadians. 6
6The di￿erential impact of the 2008/09 recession and the di￿erences in when the two
surveys were put into the ￿led is revealed in the much higher percentage of Americans seeing
12Figure 6: FFactors determining upward economic mobility: Per cent responding
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Further, results from the World Values Survey corroborate this conclusion.
The 2005-06 wave of this international survey asked slightly over 2,000 Canadi-
ans and about 1,200 Americans a series of related questions. Two of the most
pertinent asked for the level of agreement with the following statements: (1)
￿In the long-run hard work usually brings a better life￿; (2) ￿Some people feel
believe that individuals can decide their own destiny, while others think that it
is impossible to escape a predetermined fate￿. On a ten point scale, 49 percent
of respondents from each country indicated a high level agreement to the ￿rst
statement (answering 1, 2 or 3 on a ten point scale), while in response to the
second statement 45 percent of Americans and 53 percent of Canadians felt that
people shape their own lives (similarly answering among the top three levels of
agreement on a ten point scale).
As might be expected from these ￿ndings Americans and Canadians also
have similar attitudes toward equality of outcomes and equality of opportunities
as public policy priorities. Respondents were presented with a series of facts
about the degree of economic mobility drawn from the academic literature,
including most notably the facts about the degree of mobility at the top and
bottom of the earnings distribution described in Figures 2 and 3. The question
is stated as follows:
I am going to read you some facts about economic mobility in this
country. After each one I read, please tell me whether you believe
the state of the economy as being essential or very important. This said, the survey also found
that 79 percent of Americans believe that it was still possible for people to get ahead during
the downturn.
13this represents a major problem for this country, a minor problem,
not much of a problem or no problem at all:
 About (40 percent of Americans / one-third of Canadians) who
are born to parents at the bottom of the income ladder are still
there as adults.
 More than 30 percent of children who are born to parents at
the top of the income ladder are still there as adults.
Exactly the same majority of respondents in the two countries￿53 percent￿
suggested that the di￿culties in moving upward for those born at the bottom
was a major problem, while a much smaller proportion￿17 percent in the United
States and 12 percent in Canada￿suggested that the persistence in status of
those born to the top was a major problem. These patterns are essentially
the same when reference is made directly to the distinction between equality of
outcomes and equality of opportunities as public policy problems. In responding
to the question ￿What do you think is more important for this country: to reduce
inequality, or to ensure everyone has a fair chance of improving their economic
standing?￿ 71 percent of Americans and 68 percent of Canadians cited ensuring
a fair chance, while respectively only 21 percent and 26 percent cited reducing
inequality.7
The most notable di￿erence between the two countries concerns the role of
government as a means of in￿uencing economic mobility. The question ￿Gener-
ally speaking, do you think the government does more to help or more to hurt
people trying to move up the economic ladder?￿ does not garner majority sup-
port one way or the other in either of the countries. But 46 percent of Canadians
feel that government does more to help than to hurt, compared to 36 percent of
Americans. On the other hand, 46 percent of Americans feel government does
more to hurt versus 39 percent of Canadians. 8 These di￿erences are wider than
any other di￿erences in responses to all the questions addressed to these two
groups of citizens.9
In summary, both Americans and Canadians have a strong belief that to
some signi￿cant degree individuals￿through their own energy, talents, and
7The World Values Survey does not ask exactly the same question. However, it does ask for
the level of agreement on a ten point scale to the following statement: ￿Incomes should be more
equal￿. Roughly one-￿fth to one-quarter of respondents in the two countries answered 1, 2, or
3 with 1 implying complete agreement. The Canadian percentage was just over one-quarter.
8The remaining 15 to 18 percent either responded both, depends, or neither.
9The major exception to this is the response to the role of the economy as a factor de-
termining economic mobility, as depicted in Figure 6. This likely re￿ects the fact that the
recession starting in the autumn of 2008 was felt much more strongly in the United States, and
also that the American poll was put into the ￿eld only two or so months afterward. In Canada
the recession, while signi￿cant, did not increase the unemployment rate to the same degree,
nor did it have as signi￿cant impact on the housing sector. In addition, the Canadian poll was
put into the ￿eld some ten months after it started. Americans are also more inclined to see
their children as having living standards. But it is not clear how to interpret this ￿nding. It
could re￿ect di￿erences in the severity of the recession if respondents are in￿uenced by short
term developments. Alternatively it could also re￿ect a longer term perspective, but be the
result of the greater inequality at the bottom of the income distribution in the United States.
14Figure 7: E￿ectiveness of steps government could take to improve economic
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choices￿determine their chances of success in life, and in particular prospects
for upward mobility. At ￿rst look it is reasonable to suggest that a strong
sense of individual responsibility, in both de￿ning what it means to get ahead
in life and in the way to achieve it, gives limited support for government in-
volvement. But the conclusion that ￿Americans’ strong emphasis on individual
responsibility in determining economic mobility informs their understanding of
government’s role￿ does not entirely capture the full picture. 10 This should not
simply be interpreted as meaning that a strong sense of the individual implies
a diminished role for public policy. Canadians emphasize individual respon-
sibility to exactly the same degree, yet feel the government is more likely to
support than than to hinder the individual. American attitudes could re￿ect,
and be based upon, actual experience with government programs￿their design
and implementation, and a mismatch between the goals that they are ultimately
addressing and those citizens would prefer￿rather than an inherent aversion to
government involvement.
In other words, the cross-country comparison raises the possibility that the
American view that government does more to hurt than to help economic mobil-
ity is less a re￿ection of a belief as to what government should do, but rather an
assessment of what it actually does. After all the American survey also points
out that respondents believe there are e￿ective steps government could under-
take to improve economic mobility. These are illustrated in Figure 7, which
shows that Americans are in fact more likely than Canadians to say￿across the
entire range of options put to them￿that a particular intervention would be
10The quotation is from Economic Mobility Project (2009), page 16.
15very e￿ective in promoting economic mobility. 11
A couple of these options￿cutting taxes and cutting taxes for middle income
families￿imply a smaller presence for government. These options are said to be
very e￿ective by a small majority of Americans, but by a minority of Canadians.
This could re￿ect a greater preference among Americans for smaller government,
or it could re￿ect a greater dissatisfaction with what government is actually
doing with the revenues obtained.
But at the same time it should also be noted that tax-cutting ranks lower
than many other options, all of which have strong majorities of American re-
spondents saying they would be very e￿ective. Very roughly there is a similar
ranking of these options across the two countries, but￿with the exception of
promoting marriage￿all of them obtain a majority or close to a majority opinion
in the United States. In Canada only eight of sixteen receive majority support,
with many garnering substantially less support than in the United States. The
most graphic illustration of the di￿erences between the opinions of the citizens
of these two countries is in the case of health care. The di￿erent institutional
context leads to two-thirds of Americans suggesting that a reduction in health
care costs would be very e￿ective, but only about one-third of Canadians feel
the same way. In other words, the di￿erences between the countries may in
some degree be taken to re￿ect di￿erent perceptions of satisfaction with what
their governments are actually doing, rather than just di￿erent values toward
the underlying legitimacy of intervention.
If there is some validity to this interpretation of the ￿ndings, then there is
actually more scope for increased government involvement in promoting eco-
nomic mobility in the United States than in Canada. In some sense there might
be an unmet need in the United States. As such it is important and informative
to appreciate what public policy actually does to promote economic mobility.
4 Two portraits of child well-being
How di￿erent is the extent and the nature of investments these countries make in
their children? Is child well-being and are child outcomes di￿erent as a result of
these investments? And consequently to what extent can we expect the degree
of generational mobility observed for the current generation of young adults to
continue for the next generation?
We respond to these questions by loosely organizing a descriptive analysis
of the well-being of children and the situation in which they are growing up
around the framework developed by Solon (2004). Solon adapts the often cited
11The exact wording of the question is: ￿Now I am going to read you some steps the gov-
ernment could take in improving economic mobility in this country and giving people the
opportunity to improve their chances of moving up the income ladder or the chances of their
children. For each one I read, please tell me if you believe this would be very e￿ective, some-
what e￿ective, not very e￿ective or not e￿ective at all.￿ The options ￿Reforming Employment
Insurance￿ and ￿Allowing private provision of health care￿ are asked only in the Canadian
survey. ￿Employment Insurance￿ is the o￿cial term referring to the country’s unemployment
insurance program.
16Becker and Tomes (1979) model of intergenerational mobility in way appropriate
for comparisons across countries. The portrait we paint is also informed by a
wide literature on the in￿uence of early childhood development on long run
outcomes, as exempli￿ed for example by Knudson et al. (2006), but it is a
portrait and not a rigorous causal analysis. Our description uses a number of
nationally representative surveys and is addressed to a group of children who
are newborns to 13 years of age just before the year 2000. 12 These are children
growing up during the 1990s and the ￿rst years of the new millennium, who in
the coming decade or two will be the next generation of adults. In other words,
they are the cohort who, when they become young adults in the coming years,
will be the subject of the next wave of intergenerational mobility studies. But
this also underscores an important caveat: the analysis does not refer to the
situation of the most recent cohort of young people, nor to the institutional and
policy setting since roughly the year 2000 that will determine their prospects.
To paraphrase, perhaps a bit too liberally, Solon (2004) we can imagine the
adult outcomes of children being determined by three broad forces: the family,
the labour market, and government policy. Families have di￿erent capacities
and resources for investing in their children, and they face di￿erent incentives
to do so according to socio-economic status and across countries. The degree
to which inherent family traits and family speci￿c investments are passed on
to the next generation re￿ects a wide range of in￿uences, some speci￿c to the
national context.
At the most general level families with more human and social capital￿
broadly de￿ned as education, health, geographic location and other attributes
that increase long run capacities and labour market success but at the same
time are subject to individual choice￿invest more in their children. One aspect
of this is that families with more children will invest less in each child. This
should be understood as referring to the number of children per adult in the
12For the United States these include the 1999 National Survey of American Families
(NSAF) and the 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS); for Canada they include the 1998
National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY) and the 1998 Survey of Labour
and Income Dynamics (SLID). For both countries we also use The International Mathematics
and Science Study (TIMMS). The NSAF and the NLSCY form the basis for a large part
of the analysis. These data were the most comprehensive available at the time we began
our research, to address issues dealing with the comparative study of the broad well-being of
Canadian and American children. The majority of the information was derived from questions
asked of the ‘person most knowledgeable’ about the child. This person was a woman for 92.3
percent of the Canadian children considered, and for 80.8 percent of the American children.
Most often this woman was the biological mother of the child.
For some variables studied, for example family income, the NSAF and NLSCY do not
provide the best available information. In these cases, we draw upon the CPS, the SLID and
also for some American outcomes the 1999 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Mother-
Child Supplement.
All estimates reported are weighted, and we only describe di￿erences between the countries
that are statistically signi￿cant in the sense that the 95 percent con￿dence intervals around
the point estimates do not overlap. This allows multiple comparisons, though the test is
stronger than the usual tests for signi￿cant di￿erence at the 5 percent level. Standard errors
used to construct the con￿dence intervals take account of both the survey design and the fact
that some children are siblings and hence not independent observations.
17family, so that a family of two parents and two children might be said to have
fewer children per adult than a single-parent family with two children￿putting
issues of economies of scale in both time and money aside.
But it is important to emphasize that these investments are both monetary
and non-monetary. Parental ￿nancial investments as well as the time they
spend with their children are important in determining their well-being and
long run capabilities. In some contexts time and money will be complements, in
others they will be substitutes. But as Knudson et al. (2006) and others have
emphasized, the early childhood development literature points to the important
role of a child’s attachment to the mother during the early years as an in￿uence
on socialization that also impacts on later developments and opportunities for
the child.
But the capacity and the incentives to invest in children are also in￿uenced
by factors outside of the family, particularly how families interact and interface
with the labour market and public programs. An increase in the cost of hu-
man capital investment, such as in market based provision of child care, private
primary schooling, or college tuition fees, will lead to lower human capital in-
vestment. At the same time a higher return to human capital will create an
incentive for more investment. Solon (2004) takes the rate of return to edu-
cation as an indicator of the degree of inequality in the labour market, and
shows that societies with labour markets characterized by more cross-sectional
inequality￿that is a higher return to education￿will be less generationally
mobile. Inequality in the here-and-now causally leads to more transmission of
inequality across generations. Higher returns to human capital increase both
the resources and capacities of families with high levels of human capital to
invest in their children as well as the incentive to do so.
Public policy can both accentuate and dampen this in￿uence of labour mar-
ket inequality. Solon also shows that generational mobility is promoted by
￿progressive￿ public programs, those that are of relatively more bene￿t to the
relatively less well o￿. As such it is not simply the level of public expenditures
that is important, but rather how those expenditures are distributed according
to socio-economic status. Indeed, his use of public programs is broader than
just public transfers or publicly provided child directed programs. The term
should be understood as referring to all aspects of public actions that in￿uence
the relationship between families and the labour market, which in addition to
expenditures include the structure of taxation and regulations. An important
example would be the use of a very narrow tax base such as local property
taxes to ￿nance public schooling, as opposed to progressive income taxes. The
former is less ￿progressive￿ than the latter in that it likely implies higher quality
schooling to those who are relatively better o￿. Globally, public intervention
can give relatively more support to less well o￿ families compensating them for
more challenging family situations or a lack of a foothold in the labour market,
or it can be of relatively more bene￿t to the well o￿. The more unequal the
labour market the more challenging this role, one that could also to some degree
crowd out private investments.
184.1 Parents, families, and family life
Parents and families are central to the well-being of children in both the here-
and-now, but also over the longer term as they grow into adulthood. Children
require the material sustenance money can buy, but also the non-material care
￿owing from the time they share with their parents and other care-givers. The
￿ndings in this section sketch the circumstances that might o￿er both opportu-
nities and challenges for parents to meet the monetary and non-monetary needs
of their children.
Age, ethnic background, and immigrant status in a rough way all signal the
extent and types of networks parents have and potentially how well established
they are in the labour market. In particular, younger mothers are typically less
secure economically insofar as they have not had time to ￿nish an education,
have not found a secure job, and face much higher rates of unemployment than
older mothers. Parents o￿er not only monetary support to their children, they
also o￿er time. Research indicates that, even after controlling for economic
status, outcomes for children whose mothers were very young at the time of
the child’s birth are on average not as good as outcomes for children with older
mothers. Young mothers may face a host of stresses associated with a lack of
parenting experience and family support. Indeed, family structure is often cited
as one of the most important determinants of child attainments. Living in a
small family with two biological parents may o￿er the highest odds of setting
a child down a successful path; living with a lone-parent and in a large family
may o￿er the lowest.13
Research also shows that the mother’s education is a very strong correlate of
child well-being and outcomes. But this association is strongest for mothers with
low levels of education. Having a mother with very low education is linked with
signi￿cantly worse outcomes for children, but high levels of parental education
are not any more signi￿cantly tied to better outcomes than are intermediate
levels. As a result di￿erences between Canada and the United States in the
post-secondary attainment of parents may not be particularly important for
children.14
All of these characteristics and resources may in￿uence parenting style.
13See for example Blum Munroe et al. (1988) and Dooley et al. (1998). The research is not
entirely clear on the causal mechanisms at work. For example, two comparable studies￿one
using Canadian data and another American￿both ￿nd that children who witness the divorce
of their parents do not have inferior labour market outcomes in adulthood (Corak 2001, Lang
and Zagorsky 2001). Other studies have pointed out that the negative or stressful experiences
prior to separation of the parents may be the link with poor child outcomes, not the divorce
per se. And still other studies suggest that what happens after wards may count. In particular,
one American report has found that, at least with respect to certain aspects of health care,
step-mothers tend to invest less in their children’s well-being, the implication being that
children in blended families may be at a disadvantage (Case and Paxson 2001).
14One exception to this pattern, however, is schooling outcomes, which tend to be strongly
in￿uenced by higher levels of maternal education. All this said it is again important to
recognize that the causal mechanism from mother’s education to child outcomes is, since the
publication of Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), the subject of debate. For a comprehensive
overview of this literature see Holmlund et al. (2008).
19Given the centrality of parents in the lives of young children positive parent-
child interaction is often viewed as very important for child development and
well being, with many studies noting that parenting styles are highly correlated
with child-health outcomes.15 Mothers’ physical and mental health is thought
to have a strong association with child health status. Healthy mothers are
thought to be most capable of adopting a parenting style of most bene￿t to
their children.
For all of these reasons we begin by presenting information on the age and
education of mothers, as well as other aspects of family size and structure. Some
of the major ￿ndings are summarized in Table 1.
Canadian and American children are about the same age, but their mothers
are not.16 While mothers are on average about the same age, this masks very
di￿erent underlying distributions. Canadian children have mothers who on av-
erage are 35.5 years old, while American children have mothers who are 34.3
years of age. But Canadian mothers are noticeably more likely to be aged 35
to 44 years (48.9 percent) than American mothers (39.1 percent). Almost nine
percent of American mothers are less than 24 years of age, but in Canada only
half that proportion fall into this age group. The same general pattern holds
for fathers present in the household.
This corresponds to the fact that there are di￿erences across the countries
with respect to the age at which women gave birth. Teenage births are much
higher in the United States. In Canada 2.1 percent of children 13 years or
younger were born to teen-aged mothers, but in the United States this ￿gure￿at
8.3 percent￿is almost four times as high. These di￿erences are still noticeable
when slightly older mothers are considered. Just less than one in seven Canadian
children (15.3 percent) were born to mothers aged 20 to 24 years, but almost
one in four American children (24.6 percent) had mothers in this age group at
birth. As a result there are proportionally many more very young mothers in
the United States.17
15Parenting styles are sometimes classi￿ed as being at one extreme permissive, and at the
other authoritarian. It has been suggested that the style of greatest bene￿t to children involves
neither of these, but rather a positive-authoritative interaction. While still acknowledging the
importance of parenting style other researchers have pointed out that attributing causality
to correlations can be di￿cult. Parenting style may be as much a response to children’s
behaviour as a cause of it (Cadman et al. 1991 and Burton et al. 2002).
16In the NSAF and NLSCY data we use about 20 percent of children are two years of age
or younger, 14 percent are between the ages of three and four, 45 percent are ￿ve to ten years
of age, and about a ￿fth are 11 to 13 years of age in both countries.
17That on a proportional basis four times as many American children are born to a teenage
mother is a striking di￿erence between Canada and the United States. But it is necessary
to put this fact into a broader perspective. A comparison of teenage pregnancy rates that
includes all of the rich countries reveals, ￿rstly, that the United States stands out as having
an exceptionally high rate, and secondly, the rate in Canada is not particularly low, in fact
just the contrary.
Using 1998 data, UNICEF (2001) compares the number of births to women aged 20 or
younger in 28 rich countries. The United States had a rate of 52.1 births per 1,000 women
15 to 19 years of age, much higher than any other country. The next highest rate was 30.8,
recorded by the United Kingdom. Thus, an observation that the teen birth rate in Canada is
lower than in the United States should not be surprising, as this would be true of every other
20Table 1: The characteristics of families and parents in Canada and the United
States for children 13 years of age or younger in the late 1990s
Canada United States
Proportion of children born to teenagers 2.1 8.3
Proportion of children born to black mothers 1.7 15.7
Proportion of children born to immigrants 17.2 14.3
1. Current marital status of mothers
Married or common law 84.1 76.9
Single, divorced or separated 8.9 13.0
Single, never married 6.0 9.1
2. Family size1
No siblings 19.3 19.9
One sibling 46.0 40.0
Two siblings 24.5 24.6
Three or more siblings 10.2 15.6
3. Family size in lone parent families 2
No siblings 32.9 23.9
One sibling 41.8 33.9
Two siblings 18.7 24.5
Three or more siblings 6.6 17.7
4. Education attainment of mothers 3
Less than high school 12.1 12.9
High school diploma 17.6 31.3
Some post-secondary 27.5 16.3
Post-secondary certi￿cate 25.0 14.5
University/College degree 17.7 25.1
5. Education attainment of lone mothers 4
Less than high school 20.6 19.3
High school diploma 14.6 34.5
Some post-secondary 34.4 18.3
Post-secondary certi￿cate 22.0 14.5
University/College degree 8.4 13.4
1. Percent of all children 13 or younger.
2. Percent of all children 13 or younger living in lone mother families.
3. Percent of all children 13 or younger with a mother present.
4. Percent of all children 13 or younger living in lone mother families.
Source: Tabulations by authors using weighted data from Statistics Canada,
National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth, and the National Survey
of American Families.
21Canadian mothers are more likely to be in their late 20s or early 30s when
their children are born. Almost 70 percent of Canadian children were born to
mothers who were 25 to 34 years old. In contrast this is the case for only about
55 percent of American children. At the same time about one in eight children
in both countries had mothers 35 or older at the time of birth (13.7 percent in
Canada and 12.7 percent in the United States).
Signi￿cant proportions of children in both Canada and the United States
have either a non-white or immigrant background. The proportion of black
children is higher in the United States, almost 16 percent having a black mother
compared to only 1.7 percent in Canada. But children whose mothers are neither
white nor black constitute 9.7 percent of the population in Canada and 6.1
percent in United States.18
Canadian and American children live in very di￿erent types of families. In
Canada children are much more likely to be living with a mother who is currently
married, and even more likely to be living with both of their biological parents.
In the United States children are more likely to be living with step-parents
and in lone-mother families. Just over 84 percent of Canadian children live
with a mother who is currently married (both legal and common law), while 77
percent of American children are in the same situation. In Canada, about nine
percent of children live with mothers who are single because they are divorced
or separated, and a further six percent with mothers who were never married.
Both of these proportions are signi￿cantly higher in the United States.
But the current marital status of the mother hides some important di￿er-
ences in the nature of families between the two countries. In Canada, 78 percent
of children 13 years and younger live with both biological parents, substantially
greater than in the United States where only 65 percent of children do so. As
such there is a larger di￿erence in the proportion of children living with two bi-
ological parents than there is in the proportion living with a currently married
mother. This implies that more children in the United States live with step-
parents. Over seven percent of American children have a step parent, compared
to 5.5 percent of Canadian children. 19
American lone mothers tend to be younger than their Canadian counter-
parts, and more likely to have given birth as teenagers. Almost 15 percent of
American lone mothers are less than 25 years of age, compared to about 11
developed country.
Compared to these countries the Canadian rate of teenaged births is high. UNICEF found,
that in addition to the United States and the United Kingdom, six other countries ranked in
the top third with rates ranging from 20 to 30 births per thousand. Canada is among these,
having a rate of 20.2 births per thousand teenagers.
18Inter-racial couples are not common in either country, though slightly more likely in the
United States, amounting to ￿ve percent of American children versus 3.8 percent in Canada.
19While there are more lone-mother families in the United States than in Canada, reasons
for lone parenthood are the same. The most common circumstance is divorce or separation.
Of all children living in lone-mother families 57 percent in Canada and 53 percent in the
United States have mothers who are separated or divorced. Having a mother who never
married is also very common, making up 38 percent of the Canadian total and 42 percent of
the American.
22percent in Canada. The bulk of Canadian lone mothers￿more than four out
of very ten￿are between 35 and 44 years of age. This is a substantially higher
proportion than in the United States. Furthermore, a much higher fraction of
children 13 and younger living with lone-mothers were born when she was a
teenager. This is the case for more than 15 percent of these children in the
United States and less than 10 percent in Canada. Another di￿erence between
lone mothers in Canada and the United States has to do with the fact that in
Canada close to 85 percent are white￿not much di￿erent than the 89 percent
of all mothers who are white￿while in the United States only about 55 percent
of lone mothers are white (versus 78 percent of all mothers). Over four out of
every ten lone mothers are black, yet black mothers account for just less than
16 percent of all mothers.
Most children in both countries live in families with one other sibling, though
it is much more likely to be in a family of four or more children in the United
States. Up to 46 percent of Canadian children and 40 percent of American
children have only one sibling. About one in four children live in a family of
three children and one in ￿ve are only children. While living in a family with four
or more children is the least likely scenario, it is still relatively common. This is
particularly true in the United States where close to 16 percent of children are
in this situation.
In Canada, lone mother families are smaller than other families; the most
common arrangement in both countries is one with two children. Over 40 per-
cent of children in lone mother families have one sibling in Canada, and about
34 percent in the United States. But having no other siblings is also common
in these types of families, albeit more so in Canada than in the United States.
Fully one in three Canadian children who live with a lone mother have no sib-
lings, but in the United States this is one in four. At the same time a greater
fraction of American children with lone parents live in families of three or more
children. Children in lone mother families in the United States are slightly more
likely than are other children to have two or more siblings. In contrast, Cana-
dian children in lone mother families are much less likely to have two or more
siblings than are children in other families.
The fraction of parents not completing high school in Canada and the United
States is about the same, but in Canada a larger fraction have gone on to some
form of post-secondary education. About 12 to 13 percent of mothers have
not completed high school. In Canada, however, 27.5 percent of mothers have
some post-secondary education while 17.6 percent have a high school diploma.
Almost the reverse is true in the United States, with 16.3 percent having some
post-secondary education and almost one-third with a high school diploma.
Having a post-secondary certi￿cate or diploma (other than a university de-
gree) is more likely in Canada, while in the United States mothers are more
likely to have degrees. These di￿erences may re￿ect di￿erences in the structure
of education systems across the two countries, with certi￿cates being more com-
monly granted by Canadian community colleges which are outside the university
23system.20
Education levels are considerably lower for lone mothers compared to mar-
ried mothers. They are much more likely to have very low levels of educa-
tion, and much less likely to have high levels. But the di￿erences between
the two countries mirror the patterns for all mothers. One-￿fth of children in
lone mother families are living with a mother who does not have a high school
diploma. Lone mothers are half as likely to have completed a university degree
as married mothers, but this fraction is higher in the United States.
The NLSCY and the NSAF also show that while parents on both sides of
the border report themselves to be in good health, lone mothers and low-income
mothers report lower health status, particularly in the United States where one-
in-￿ve lone mothers say they are in poor or fair health. As documented in
Table 2 nine out of ten lone mothers in Canada report being in good or better
health, while fully one-in-ten report fair or poor health. In the United States the
proportion of lone mothers reporting fair or poor health at 21.3 percent is twice
as large. In addition, the mental health of lone mothers and low income mothers
is signi￿cantly inferior to other mothers. In Canada about one in twenty lone
mothers and low income mothers experienced a mental health problem that
persisted for at least an entire week. About seven percent felt depressed for all
or most of a week, and about ￿ve percent reported being ￿unable to shake the
blues￿ or not feeling happy. This is signi￿cantly greater than the two to three
percent of mothers overall who feel the same way. The same general patterns
hold in the United States with about double the proportion of lone mothers and
low income mothers reporting mental health problems all or most of the time
relative to mothers over all.
It is di￿cult to obtain comparable measures of parenting style across these
two countries with these surveys. One comparable indicator of parent-child in-
teraction is the extent to which children are read to. This falls short of charac-
terizing the nature of parenting style, but the data do show that approximately
64 percent of Canadian children and 46 percent of American children are read
to daily. One-quarter of Canadian children and one-half of American children
are read to between 1 and 6 days per week. Children who are never read to
comprise nearly 10 percent of the group of Canadian children between the ages
of 0 and 5; the comparable number in the United States is 7 percent.
The proportion of children who are never read to is higher in lone mother
families and particularly in low income families, in both countries. Fewer chil-
dren in these families are read to daily in comparison with all children, although
a higher proportion of these children in Canada are read to daily than of com-
parably situated children in the United States: 54.4 percent versus 36.4 percent
of low income children; and 58.9 percent versus 37.6 percent of the children of
20The pattern is much the same when fathers present in the household are compared.
Roughly the same fraction of children has fathers with less than high school, but more fathers
in the United States have a high school diploma. It is also more common for Canadian fathers
to have a post-secondary credential, but less likely to have a university degree. Furchtogott-
Roth et al. (2009) discuss the need for a greater role for community colleges in promoting




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Work and child care arrangements
Parental participation in the labour market is both cause and e￿ect of child
care arrangements. The choice or need to work means that parents must ￿nd
alternative arrangements for their children; the availability of care outside of
the home o￿ers opportunities to work or to work more hours.
In this section we begin by noting that Canadian mothers of the cohort
of children under study have higher rates of labour-force participation than
American mothers, but mothers and fathers who are in the labour force work
longer hours in the United States. On this basis alone it is not immediately
apparent how labour market engagement in￿uences the overall demand for day
care, or how di￿erences in social policy and family structure in￿uence work
patterns.
However, there are very clear di￿erences in child care policies and social
support between the two countries. Parental bene￿ts are much more generous
in Canada. During 1998 Canadian mothers who had worked a minimum of 700
hours over a 52 week period received 15 weeks of maternity bene￿ts equivalent
to 55 percent of past earnings. Another 10 weeks of leave could be taken under
the same conditions by either the mother or the father of a newborn, though
generally this parental bene￿t was taken up by mothers. Thus in Canada new
mothers who had su￿cient work experience were being provided with the op-
portunity to stay home for up to 25 weeks after the birth of their child. In 2001
this package of bene￿ts, administered by the federal government through the
national unemployment insurance program, was extended to one year. Mater-
nity bene￿ts are much more limited in the United States. Parents are entitled
to 12 weeks of leave without pay if they work in a company with more than 50
people. This covers only about half of women in the work force.
National day care programs are not o￿ered in either country. In Canada
child care is organized provincially, with some provinces o￿ering universal pro-
grams, and others subsidizing certain child-care facilities or o￿ering subsidies
or tax deductions to parents. In the United States child care is publicly pro-
vided for some vulnerable children under the Head Start programs, and there is
limited funding through the federal government for low-income working families
through the Child Care Development Fund Block Grant created in 1996. It has
been estimated that only about 12 percent of eligible children are receiving this
support. These funds can be used for child care services, and a state can also
waive fees for families below the poverty line.
Families engage with labour markets in very di￿erent ways in these two
countries, and the institutional context set by public policy is also very di￿erent.
In the United States more mothers either work full-time or not at all. Almost
30 percent of mothers in the United States are not in the paid labour force; in
Canada just under a quarter did not work. At the same time four out of every
ten children American children had mothers who worked 40 or more hours per
week, the most common arrangement. Only one quarter of Canadian children
26had mothers who worked 40 or more hours per week. Lower hours of employment
are much more common in Canada with about half of children having mothers
who worked less than 40 hours per week. This was the case for less than one-
third of children in the United States. In both countries it is relatively rare
that mothers work more than 50 hours per week, but at the same time not
uncommon. Over seven percent of children in the United States and ￿ve percent
in Canada had mothers working these very long hours. 21
In both countries the work week is much longer for fathers than it is for
mothers, with fathers in the United States in the late 1990s working more than
their Canadian counterparts. Not working at all is rather uncommon for fathers
in both countries, and the likelihood of part-time work is also not as likely as it
is for mothers. In both Canada and the United States about one-half of fathers
work 40 to 49 hours per week. But working even longer hours is signi￿cantly
more common in the United States, with almost 40 percent in this situation
compared to about 30 percent in Canada.
As a result of these patterns one-in-ten children of married couples in the
United States have parents who together work over 100 hours per week. This
high commitment to paid work is much less common in Canada, occurring for
only two out of every hundred children. The most common arrangement in
the United States is for parents to work from 80 to 99 hours per week. About
33 percent of children in the United States are in this situation, and about 25
percent of Canadian children. In contrast the most common arrangement in
Canada is for parents to be working between 60 and 79 hours per week. Just
over 35 percent of Canadian children are in such a situation, compared to 25
percent of American children.
In the United States lone mothers are more likely to be working than married
mothers. Only about one-￿fth of lone mothers do not work any hours per week,
but this is the case for almost one-third of married mothers. In Canada these
proportions are almost exactly reversed. Furthermore, just over 48 percent of
lone mothers work more than 40 hours per week in the United States, almost
double the Canadian proportion.
The ￿ip side to these employment patterns are di￿erences in care arrange-
ments for infants and toddlers, pre-schoolers, and school-aged children. The
majority of infants and toddlers in Canada are cared for by their parents; in the
United States the majority is in some other type of care. Fifty-six percent of
all children up to two years of age are cared for exclusively by their parents in
Canada, compared to 40.7 percent in the United States. This di￿erence likely
re￿ects the very di￿erent maternity and parental leave available in Canada for
working mothers of newborn children. The labour force participation of mothers
with children less than one year of age is much higher in the United States and
no di￿erent than that for mothers as a whole. In the United States 29.8 percent
21Labour force participation rates are somewhat, though not dramatically, lower for mothers
of children less than ￿ve years of age. In the United States 32.1 percent of mothers with pre-
schoolers were not engaged in paid work, compared with 29.8 percent of all mothers. In




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 4: Child care arrangements in Canada and the United States
Canada United States
1. Children 3 to 4 years of age 1
Parental Care 45.4 23.1
Day care centre 12.4 34.3
Cared for by a relative 15.2 21.3
Cared for by a non-relative 25.1 12.6
2. Children 5 to 10 years of age
in lone mother families 2
Parental care 48.1 27.7
Day care centre 3.7 5.6
Before/after school program 7.7 17.7
Cared for by a relative 18.9 30.9
Cared for by a non-relative 17.6 12.4
1. Expressed as a percentage of all children 3-4 years of age.
2. Expressed as a percentage of all children 5-10 years of age.
Totals do not add to 100 as not all child care options are considered.
Source: Tabulations by authors using weighted data from Statistics
Canada, National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth, and
the National Survey of American Families.
of women with an infant￿or virtually the same fraction as all mothers￿report
that they do not work. In Canada, 35.6 percent of mothers with newborns
report not working versus 24.8 percent of all mothers. 22
Over three-quarters of pre-schoolers are in some type of non-parental care
arrangement, while only about one-half of Canadians under ￿ve years of age
are in this situation. Pre-schoolers in the United States are on average three
times more likely to be cared for in formal day care centres than in Canada.
These facts imply that the longer work hours of mothers and fathers creates
more of a demand for non parental care than the higher overall labour market
participation in Canada, a tendency consistent with ￿exible work arrangements
permitting more part-time employment among Canadian mothers.
The majority of children ￿ve to ten years of age in Canada receive parental
care only (54.6 percent). The ￿gure is signi￿cantly lower but still substantial in
the United States at 40.7 percent. In both countries an additional one-￿fth of
children of these ages are cared for by a relative, and largely in the child’s own
22This said, while more young children in the United States are in non-parental care, the
over all pattern in the type of care is fairly similar in the two countries. In both countries an
infant is most likely to be cared for by a parent. In the United States care by a relative is
the second most likely situation, with care by relatives and non-relatives being about equally
likely in Canada. A day care centre is the least likely care arrangement for an infant or toddler
in both countries.
29home. Of the remaining children aged ￿ve to ten proportionately more in the
United States attend before and after school programs: about 14 percent versus
only about ￿ve percent in Canada. In both countries only a small fraction of
children look after themselves when their parents are working, with just over
three percent in the United States and two percent in Canada for whom this is
the case.
As the second panel of Table 4 illustrates, there is about a 20 percentage
point di￿erence between the two countries in the fraction of the school aged
children of lone mothers receiving non-parental care. Fifty-two percent of the
￿ve to ten year olds of these parents in Canada are in this situation and 72
percent in the United States. At the same time care by a relative is more
common for the children of lone mothers who are receiving non-parental care in
the United States than it is in Canada, with nearly one-third in this situation
in the United States compared with one-￿fth in Canada. As with all children,
the children of American lone mothers are more likely to attend before / after
school programs. More Canadian children, however, are separately cared for by
a non-relative (17.6 percent versus 12.4 percent), either inside or outside the
child’s home.23
It is possible that day care has a wide variety of opposing impacts on child
well-being. While high quality care might mitigate some of the disadvantages
of limited early nurturing in dysfunctional families, for example, a reduction in
the period of time during which young children can be breastfed might have
a detrimental impact on their long-term health and well-being. One of the
di￿culties inherent in assessing the overall impact of child care is that the
substitution of non-parental care for parental care has the potential to either
increase or decrease the emotional and physical resources available to a child.
If the availability of day care increases the ability of family members to work,
for example, the rami￿cations may be both positive and negative for a child.
Bushnik (2006) o￿ers a detailed description of child care arrangements in
Canada, and documents that the use of day care increased between 1995 to
2003, most notably in Quebec. In this province day care usage doubled to in-
clude 52 percent of children six months to ￿ve years of age, a ￿gure nearly double
the national average rate of 28 percent. Underlying the shift in Quebec was the
phasing in of a low-cost, universal day care program for young children between
September 1997 and September 2000. Commencing at a highly-subsidized cost
of $5 per day, costs rose slightly in 2003 to $7 per day. Baker, Gruber and Milli-
gan (2008) ￿nd evidence in the NLSCY data that a number of outcome measures
worsened for children in two-parent families in Quebec, including measures per-
taining to aggression, motor skills and illness. Measures of parental health,
mental health and parental and parent-child relationships also showed some ev-
idence of deterioration. These results may be attributable to a variety of causes,
23Child care arrangements for children 11 and 12 years of age are very similar for both
countries with greater than one-half in Canada and 45 percent in the United States receiving
parental care only, one-￿fth in each country taking care of themselves, and another one-￿fth
receiving care from a relative. Canadian children cared for by a relative are more likely than
American children to be cared for in their own home.
30either involving the nature of the child care itself, or the increases in the labour
market activity of mothers that were observed as a result of the introduction of
the universal day care program. 24
4.3 Family income, low income, and inequality
Children in the United States are on average signi￿cantly more a￿uent than
those in Canada. After taxes and government transfers the resources available
to the average child in the United States amount to $35,667 versus $27,222 in
Canada, a di￿erence of $8,445 or 31 percent. On the basis of the methods used
in the calculations this di￿erence is equivalent to $16,890 for a family of four. 25
Labour market earnings are the major source of income in both countries, but
this is signi￿cantly more so in the United States where 92 percent of children
live in families relying upon the labour market for the majority of their income.
This is the case for 83 percent of Canadian children.
On the other hand, there are marked di￿erences in the structure of govern-
ment transfers available to families with children in the two countries. Almost
nine out of every ten children in Canada live in a family receiving some form
of transfer income. The proportion of children in Canada receiving transfer
income (including, for example, child tax bene￿ts, both regular and maternity
or parental Employment Insurance bene￿ts, and social assistance) is close to
double that in the United States (87.5 percent versus 45.8 percent). Those fam-
ilies receiving transfers get an average of $3,107 dollars per child in Canada and
$2,883 in the United States.26
In Canada fully 85 percent of children in two parent families receive some
form of income support from government, but this proportion is only 35 percent
in the United States. These proportions are higher in both countries for children
living in lone parent families. Virtually all (99.7 percent) of these children are in
receipt of some amount of income transfer in Canada; 83 percent in the United
States.
Despite considerably higher average incomes children in the United States
are much more likely to be living in low income. During 1999 26.7 percent of
U.S. children versus 17.1 percent of Canadian children lived below a low income
threshold of one-half of median income. 27 On average the depth of low income
24The authors also caution that the impacts may represent short-term, transitional and not
long-term impacts, and that the potential exists for families to choose day care as a result of
bene￿ts that are not fully observable in the data.
25The di￿erence in the median living standard is not as great but still signi￿cant. The
median child has access to $27,442 in the United States and $22,703 in Canada, a $4,739
or 21 percent di￿erence. All monetary values are expressed in 1998 Canadian dollars, with
all income information drawn from two surveys explicitly designed for the purpose, the 1998
Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics and the 1999 U.S. Current Population
Survey.
26This does not account for the value of in-kind bene￿ts in the United States, nor increases
in the Earned Income Tax credit in recent years.
27On the basis of the surveys used in this section the median income in Canada for 1998
is $22,703, leading to a low income threshold of $11,351; in the United States for 1999 it is
$27,442, implying a low income threshold of $13,721. These derivations are based on samples
31is also greater in the United States. The average child in low income was 41.7
percent below the low-income threshold in the United States but 26.5 percent
below in Canada. This amounted to $6,268 in the United States and $3,213 in
Canada.
These di￿erences are the result of the fact that transfer payments reduce
the rate of low income in Canada signi￿cantly more than in the United States.
In fact, labour markets lead to roughly similar rates of low income in both
countries. About the same fraction of children would be in low income on
the basis of solely parental labour market earnings: 27.1 percent in Canada
compared with 30 percent in the United States. The depth of low income would
be greater in Canada. On average Canadian children in low income would be
60.3 percent below the low-income threshold while American children would be
50.9 percent below.
While 63.2 percent of low income Canadian children live in families report-
ing some labour market earnings, for only 30.3 percent are earnings the major
source. This is in contrast with low income children in the United States, where
earnings are the major source of income for 77.6 percent. Earnings are a smaller
share of total income in Canada because rates of labour force participation are
lower for low income parents and because government transfers are more sig-
ni￿cant. In Canada 36.8 percent of low income families with children report
zero earnings, while in the U.S. this is so for only 11.7 percent. Virtually all
(99.9 percent) Canadian families of children in low income receive some form
of transfer payment. Receipt of transfer income is also the norm in the United
States but not as high, with 93.1 percent of low income families with children
report receiving some amount of support.
In both Canada and the United States children are signi￿cantly more likely
to be in the bottom of the country-wide income distribution. About 15 percent
of children in each country are found in the bottom 10 percent of the income
distribution for the entire population and only about 5 to 6 percent in the top
10 percent. While children in the two countries ￿t into their respective country
income distributions in much the same way, the gap between a child at the top
and one at the bottom is much larger in the United States. The child in the
top 10 percent of the United States income distribution has on average over 14
times as much income as a child in the bottom 10 percent. In Canada this ratio
is 7.5. The di￿erences are also signi￿cant when the average middle income child
is compared to the average child in the bottom tenth. In the United States the
child in the middle of the income distribution has 4.6 times as much income as
a child in the bottom; in Canada only 2.7 times as much.
These di￿erences re￿ect the fact that the income distribution in the United
States is much more unequal than in Canada, with a larger fraction of individuals
having a much higher than average income and a larger fraction having a much
representing the entire population of each country, not just the children. One half of median
income is a threshold currently highlighted by the Luxembourg Income Study, a research
network and data archive directed to international comparative research. Accordingly our
derivations follow this precedent, including the use of the square root of household size as the
equivalence scale.
32Figure 8: Distribution of children in Canada and the United States in the
American Income Distribution
 
Source: Calculations by authors using 1999 Current Population Survey for the
United States and 1998 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics for Canada.
lower than average income. As Figure 8 illustrates, this also implies that the
incomes of the strong majority of Canadian children would place them in the
lower middle portion of the United States income distribution. Just less than
two-thirds of Canadian children (64.2 percent) have incomes that would rank
them above the bottom tenth of the income distribution but no higher than
the middle. Only 24.4 percent of Canadian children have incomes su￿ciently
great to place them in the top half of the United States distribution, compared
with 38.9 percent of United States children. The chances a Canadian child
will be in the top tenth of the United States income distribution are only 1.5
percent versus 5.2 percent for American children. At the same time, Figure 8
also illustrates that Canadian children are less likely to have an income placing
them in the bottom of the American income distribution. Only 11.4 percent of
Canadian children would ￿nd themselves in the bottom 10 percent, a situation
faced by 15.6 percent of United States children.
Other indicators of material well-being also point to the fact that Canadian
children live in less extreme circumstances. Over three quarters (76 percent) of
Canadian families with young children own the home in which they live. In the
United States 63 percent of families with children own their homes. Rates of
home ownership are much lower for low income families in both countries. In
Canada four-in-ten low income families own the home in which they live, and
33in the United States 3.6 of every ten do so.
As well as being a proxy for wealth home ownership may also indicate a
greater overall level of stability. Frequent residential moves, for example, have
been shown to be a correlate of poorer outcomes for children. For example,
Coleman (1988) treats residential moves as a marker for the disruption of the
social capital and networks available to the family and child. In our data,
over half of children between the ages of two and thirteen have moved at least
once in their life time, with the proportion being higher in the United States
and higher among low income children. In Canada 57.6 percent of children
experienced a change of residence; in the United States 65.4 percent. Both of
these percentages are greater for low income children. In Canada close to seven
out of 10 low income children (68 percent) changed residence at some point in
their lives; in the United States close to three-quarters (74 percent). About the
same fraction of children from lone mother families in the two countries changed
residences, 76 percent in Canada and 74 percent in the United States.
Living conditions are more crowded in the United States with 0.93 children’s
bedrooms per child versus 1.01 in Canada. Over one-￿fth of Canadian children
(22 percent) live in homes with a ‘room to spare’ compared to 18 percent of
American children. In the United States, where there are larger families, almost
half of children (46.9 percent) share a bedroom with a sibling, while about a
third of Canadian children (34.3 percent) are in the same situation. Low income
children live in more crowded arrangements in both countries, but more so in
the United States where 70 percent share a bedroom and only 6.5 percent live
in homes with extra bedrooms. In Canada 57.4 percent of low income children
share a room and about 9 percent live in homes having more bedrooms than
children or adults in the house.
5 Early childhood outcomes and the prospects
for economic mobility
These con￿gurations of forces￿family structure and family life, care giving ar-
rangements and participation in the labour market, and ￿nancial resources from
the market and the state in both an absolute and a relative sense￿all come to-
gether to determine the relationship between a child’s socio-economic status
and well-being in the here-and-now as well as capacities for succeeding in life.
A series of intermediate outcomes links family background to adult outcomes.
In particular, mental and physical health, as well as cognitive development and
readiness to learn, have all been shown to vary with social and economic back-
ground, and in this section we document di￿erences in these outcomes between
Canada and the United States, and speculate on the prospects for economic
mobility in the two countries.
It is not possible to sketch a direct causal link between the di￿erences in
resources available to children in these two countries, and the early outcomes
that will in￿uence their long-term prospects. But if there is a relationship our
34portrait of child well-being in Canada and the United States would suggest
that di￿erences in the prospects of the children on the two sides of the border
should be evident even at the early ages which are the focus of our analysis.
The cohorts of young children under study￿particularly the relatively less well
o￿￿were being raised in more challenging family circumstances in the United
States. Younger, less well-educated parents, who are more likely to also be single
parents, and who must obtain a larger fraction of their income from employment
yet have less ￿exibility in their choice of child care arrangements and hours of
work, ￿nd themselves in more stressful situations. The challenges of providing
for both the monetary and non-monetary needs of their children are greater for
those at the bottom of the income ladder in the United States. In fact, the
absolute disadvantages faced by these children is more severe than the situation
of their relatively disadvantaged counterparts in Canada.
If these patterns had also held a generation ago it may not be surprising that
bottom decile sons in Canada are as likely to move to the top half of the earnings
distribution as third decile Americans. These di￿erences in absolute advantage
re￿ect not just more challenging family situations, but also the stronger presence
of a more unequal labour market in family life. This presence is not given as
large a counterweight with public programs, either through child care and leave
policies, tax-transfer programs, or broad-based public provision of health care
and public education of relatively more advantage to the disadvantaged. In this
sense all three elements of Solon’s model￿family, labour markets, and public
policy￿o￿er less support to those at the bottom of the income distribution in
the United States than in Canada.
The suggestion would be that the gap in the degree of generational economic
mobility between these two countries described for a previous generation of
young adults in the existing empirical literature is likely not to be narrowed
for the children growing up during the 1990s, those who will come of age in the
next decade or so. This is not a statement on the current con￿guration of public
policy in the United States to the extent that it has changed for the cohort of
children born since 2000. But if this speculation has any validity then we should
already begin to see di￿erences in the outcomes relevant for economic mobility
among the children who are the subject of our analysis. Consequently we focus
on three related outcomes that interact in a recursive way to set a trajectory
for a child and o￿er both risks and opportunities for long run success: mental
and physical health; cognitive outcomes and readiness to learn; early education
outcomes.
Empirical research has documented a strong positive association between
income and health in adulthood, and that there are antecedents for this rela-
tionship in childhood. Poor health in childhood is likely to exert a long-run
in￿uence through two channels: directly through its in￿uence on the person’s
likely health as an adult; and indirectly through its e￿ects on schooling and the
accumulation of other experience. An understanding of the relationship between
family background and income on the one hand, and health in childhood on the
other, may therefore signal the nature of the long term prospects for children
living in low income families, and hence the probable degree of economic mo-
35bility. Recent research has highlighted the empirical observations that children
with low socioeconomic status not only have worse health than do children with
high socioeconomic status, but that the di￿erence in health between the two
groups is more pronounced for older than for younger children.
The study of this relationship, furthermore, bene￿ts from a clear expected
direction of causation, since child health likely does not determine child socio-
economic status. The same cannot be said of adult health. These ￿ndings have
been derived from Canadian as well as American data, and exist in Canada
despite the presence of universal public health insurance coverage of doctor and
hospital services (Case et al. 2002, Currie and Stabile 2003, Oreopoulos et al.
2008, Phipps 2002, Smith 2009). The widening gap in the health of children of
low and high socio-economic status as they age is hypothesized to stem from
one of two factors: either low income children are less able to adapt to and
recover from adverse health ￿shocks￿ than are other children, so the impacts
of health events persist and accumulate for them; or, alternately, low income
children respond similarly to single negative health events in the long term but
are subject to a greater incidence of shocks over time. 28
Table 5 shows that the mental health of children varies strongly with socio-
economic status in both the United States and Canada. Canadian and American
mothers report that 70 percent of their children are never nervous, high strung
or tense. Approximately one-fourth of their children sometimes exhibit these
tendencies, and 3 in 100 children do so often. Although there are no signi￿-
cant di￿erences noted between the United States and Canada for any type of
household, children in lone mother or low income families in both countries are
less likely to never be nervous, high strung or tense relative to children in all
families. The di￿erence is 9 percent in Canada and 6 percent in the United
States. In Canada these children are nearly twice as likely as all children to
exhibit these tendencies often.
About 60 percent of mothers in both Canada and the United States report
that their children have never experienced concentration problems. As with ner-
vousness and tension, no di￿erences are apparent across countries, but children
in lone parent and low income households in both countries are 10 percent more
likely than are all children to have concentration di￿culties.
At the same time, Canadian children are reported to be happier than Amer-
ican children. Mothers report that 75 percent of Canadian children and 66 per-
cent of American children are never miserable, unhappy, tearful, or distressed.
About one-fourth of Canadian children and one-third of American children are
reported to sometimes be in this state, and 1 percent and 2 percent of Canadian
and American children respectively are reported to be so often. The percentage
of children often unhappy or distressed is slightly higher among low income or
lone mother families in each country, but there are no signi￿cant di￿erences
28Currie and Stabile (2003) use the NLSCY to demonstrate support for the second hypoth-
esis. At the same time other research has demonstrated that low income or less educated
individuals and their children may be hindered in utilizing health services by such economic
and social barriers as the cost of transportation to visit health care providers, an inability to
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37in rates for these family types between the two countries. At the same time,
children in lone mother families are less likely than other children to never be
miserable or unhappy. In Canada these children are nearly 15 percent less likely
than other children to never be unhappy; the comparable gap in the United
States is 7 percent.
Physical health of children also varies across these two countries. American
mothers are more inclined to report their children as being in only fair or poor
health. Approximately 60 percent of children in each country are reported to be
in excellent health, and 29.2 percent in Canada and 26.4 percent in the United
States are reported to be in very good health. At 4 percent versus 1.6 percent,
more than twice as many children in the United States are reported to be in
fair or poor health as in Canada. Although children in lone mother families are
worse o￿ relative to all children in both countries, Canadian children in these
families fare better than their American counterparts, with 2 percent versus 7
percent reported being in fair or poor health. A similar pattern emerges with
respect to low income children, with 3 percent in Canada and 7.6 percent in the
United States reported to have either fair or poor health.
More Canadian than American children visit the doctor in a given year,
and with greater frequency; the opposite is true of visits to nurses. Nearly
84 percent of Canadian children and 77 percent of American children make
physician visits. Children in Canada on average also make a greater number of
visits to physicians: 3.3 versus 2.7 per year. Nurse visits on the other hand are
higher in the United States, with 35 percent of children in the United States
and 19 percent of Canadian children receiving care from a nurse. The average
number of nurse visits per child is also greater in the United States. These
patterns likely have a good deal to do with the universal provision of health
care in Canada. They are not, for example, evident with respect to visits to
dentists, which in general are not covered by public health insurance in either
country. Almost 80 percent of children aged 3 to 13 in both Canada and the
United States make dental visits.
Children in lone mother and low income families are in general as likely as
other children to see a physician in Canada. But while this pattern holds true in
the United States for children from lone mother households, a slightly smaller
proportion of American children from low income households, relative to all
children, see a doctor during the year. In general the average numbers of doctor
visits are alike across the di￿erent groups in each country, although in Canada
the children of lone mothers and low income families make slightly more visits
than do all children.29 Interestingly, this is not the case for visits to a dentist. In
Canada only two-thirds of children from low income families, and three-fourths
29The relative similarities in the utilization of physician services within Canada and be-
tween the children of lone mothers and all children in the United States may seem somewhat
surprising in light of the earlier observation that low income and lone mother children su￿er
on average from poorer health. This may be particularly true in Canada where public health
insurance means that ￿nancial barriers to care should be limited; visit levels may therefore re-
￿ect other types of access barriers such as transportation issues or gaps in knowledge regarding


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39from lone mother families visit a dentist, compared￿as mentioned￿to almost
80 percent for children regardless of family type. In addition, there are no
signi￿cant di￿erences in these rates across the two countries.
American children have higher rates of hospitalization. About 4.5 percent of
Canadian children versus 8 percent of American children are hospitalized dur-
ing the year, a fact that may seem surprising given that a higher proportion of
children are seen by physicians in Canada. It may be that visits to physicians
act as an avoidance measure against some hospitalizations, or that the relatively
poorer health of children in the United States leads to higher rates of hospitaliza-
tion. As with doctor visits, patterns of hospitalization for di￿erent family types
are relatively similar within each of the two countries. However, the children of
low income parents are slightly more likely to experience a hospitalization than
are other children. In Canada 5.9 percent stay overnight in hospital versus 4.5
percent of all children; in the United States 8.7 percent of low income children
in comparison with 7.9 percent of all children are hospitalized during the year.
The between-country di￿erences are signi￿cant for all groups. 30
Mental and physical health are important in their own right, but also because
they may in￿uence cognitive and learning outcomes. In fact, early learning and
vocabulary development also varies signi￿cantly across the countries, with 4
and 5 year old Canadian children scoring signi￿cantly higher on a comparable
test of school readiness. Canadian four year-olds have an average raw score on
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test that is 10.3 percent above that of four
year-old children in the United States. The gap for ￿ve year-olds is smaller at
6.2 percent, but still favours Canadian children. 31
Mothers in the two countries report that similar proportions of children be-
tween the ages of 6 and 13 are doing well at school, although those in Canada
report that a slightly higher proportion of children are doing very well (44 per-
cent versus 38 percent). Mothers in the United States report a higher percentage
of children with average performance: 28 percent versus 23 percent in Canada.
As with mothers’ assessments of health, the most notable di￿erence between
Canadian children and American children is at the bottom of the scale. The
proportion of children performing below the middle or near the bottom in school
is twice in the United States what it is in Canada (7 percent versus 3.4 percent).
The schooling results for lone mother or low income children are not quite as
good as for other children in both countries, although the same basic patterns
in reports from mothers arise for them. Speci￿cally, 5.8 percent of the children
30Children in the United States are also more likely to visit a mental health professional
than are children in Canada. Approximately 6 percent of American children and 4 percent
Canadian visit a mental health professional during the year, with American children also
making a greater average number of visits. Recall that Canadian children are reported to be
happier than are American children, although there are no signi￿cant di￿erences between the
two countries with respect to nervousness and tension or di￿culty concentrating.
31During the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) children are shown a set of pictures
and asked to identify the one matching the word spoken to them. Their raw scores count the
number of correct responses given. This test is regarded as a good measure of ‘school readiness’
and correlates well with future success at school as well as having the possible advantage that
it is not a subjective assessment provided by the parent.
40of lone mothers are performing poorly in school in Canada in comparison with
10.7 percent in the United States. The di￿erence for low income children is not
as stark but is still signi￿cant between the two countries, with 5.3 percent in
Canada and 8.3 percent in the United States performing poorly or very poorly
in school.
Granted these indicators lack a certain objectivity. After all in both coun-
tries well over two-thirds of the children are reported by their mothers to be
doing better than average in school. While this result is not unique to these
data or this study, it is the di￿erences between the two countries that are im-
portant. Furthermore, these di￿erences hold up in more comprehensive tests of
older children. For example, The International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) o￿ers information on how children aged 12 and 13 years compare across
countries on standardized math and science tests. According to these results
Canadian children perform substantially better on average in mathematics and
somewhat better in science than do children in the United States. Both Cana-
dian and American children are above the international mean for the math and
science test scores. For the United States the standardized mean math score
is 501.6 while for Canada is about 1/3 of a standard deviation higher at 530.8.
The Canadian standardized mean score for science is slightly higher at 533.1,
but the American science score is also higher than its math score at 514.9. Ac-
cording to these measures, Canadian children are doing substantially better in
math and somewhat better in science than American children. 32
Along most of these dimensions￿mental and physical health, early learning,
and academic performance in primary school￿Canadian children, but particu-
larly Canadian children from lone-parent or low income families have on average
better outcomes than their American counterparts. As such this picture lines
up with the di￿erences in resources available to these children through family,
markets, and public policy, and this would lead us to suggest that the founda-
tion for economic mobility is already being laid in the years before these children
become teenagers and make decisions concerning higher education and occupa-
tion of employment. As such it is very likely that the di￿erences in the degree
of generational mobility documented for young adults who came of age during
the 1990s will continue at least for another generation of young adults.
6 Conclusions
In the United States there is a long social science tradition recognizing the value
of a federal structure in developing e￿ective public policies. Signi￿cant varia-
tions in public programs across States o￿ers opportunities for learning about
what works and what doesn’t, and hence for the re￿nement of policy goals
and improvements in program implementation. Our comparative study of the
relationship between family economic background and adult outcomes in the
United States and Canada is o￿ered in this spirit, by extending the scope of
the comparison across countries it o￿ers another dimension for understanding
32See the TIMSS website at http://ustimss.msu.edu for more information.
41the nature of social goals, and how di￿erent institutional contexts play out in
attaining them.
There are important similarities and di￿erences between these two countries.
The starting point for our analysis is the di￿erence in outcomes that has been
observed in the empirical economics literature dealing with economic mobility
across the generations. International comparisons of the average degree of gen-
erational earnings mobility suggest that Canada is more mobile than the United
States, but a closer look at studies that use particularly high quality data that
are directly comparable across this pair of countries suggests that the di￿erence
is even larger than implied by the broad international literature. On average
Canada is up to three times more mobile than the United States. Or another
way of putting it, up to three times as much inequality is passed across the
generations in the United States than in Canada. Furthermore, these di￿er-
ences arise from di￿erences in the extremes of the earnings distribution: there
is notably less mobility at the very top and the very bottom of the American
income ladder. For this reason we focus our more detailed comparative analysis
not just on the average child but also on the relatively disadvantaged, and try
to chart the prospects for upward mobility in these two countries.
These cross-country di￿erences in outcomes are not a re￿ection of di￿erent
societal preferences, or interpretations of the meaning of equality of opportunity.
In fact, it is valuable to compare these two particular relatively rich countries
because they are so much alike. This similarity in public attitudes is con￿rmed
in the comparative public opinion polls conducted and reported upon. Both
countries value the ideal of equality of opportunity, and both de￿ne it in terms
of individual freedoms but also individual responsibilities. Americans, however,
are more inclined to view government as doing more to hinder than help this
process. Yet, at the same time the citizens of both countries recognize the need
for public policy to contribute to reaching this ideal, with Americans believing
more than Canadians that a whole host of interventions would be e￿ective in
improving the prospects for economic mobility. One interpretation of these
￿ndings￿an interpretation that only becomes evident a comparative context￿
is that in some sense this need is going unmet in the United States.
This is re￿ected in the actual resources available to children. We o￿er a
descriptive overview of these resources organized loosely around a model of
intergenerational economic mobility that highlights the role of families, labour
markets, and public policies as together determining the degree of mobility
and explaining di￿erences between jurisdictions. The family context in which
children are raised in the United States is more challenging than in Canada,
raising the risks that some children will not see the full development of their
capabilities. American labour markets are also more unequal raising the stakes
for child outcomes, both elevating opportunities and heightening risks. Finally,
public policy is less ￿progressive,￿ not compensating in the same degree for
family background and labour market inequality.
The portrait we paint of young children across these three dimensions un-
derscores the fact that childhood outcomes di￿er for children before they reach
their teen years, and potentially set them down pathways that will lead to dif-
42ferent adult outcomes. Mental and physical health, school readiness, and some
education outcomes are all more developed in Canada. But this portrait also
highlights some particularly relevant institutional di￿erences in public policy
between the countries that merit closer attention as the underlying causes.
The ￿rst concerns health care. The universal provision of accessible health
care in Canada plays a role in the preventative care of children, reducing the
number and severity of health shocks that could potentially lead to more severe
di￿culties. But in both countries issues of access are also more subtle, associated
with economic and social barriers limiting visits to health care providers, ability
to pay for prescriptions, and knowledge as to how to navigate the health care
system. The anecdotal evidence provided by Scott (2005) with respect to the
ability of adults to access and respond to care providers in the United States
probably rings true for children on both sides of the border.
The second concerns the ￿exibility that parents have in making child care
choices and deciding upon hours of work. The two countries have very di￿erent
policies that o￿er di￿erent opportunities for parents in balancing the demands
of family and workplace, particularly in the early years of a child’s life. Cana-
dian mothers and fathers would appear to have more ￿exibility as a result of
signi￿cant policy changes in the mid 1990s that extended paid leave during the
year after a child’s birth as well as the legislative right to return to their jobs.
There seems also to be more use of part-time employment. In the United States
the limited nature of parental leave leads to a polarization in family decisions,
with relatively well-o￿ families able to either a￿ord private child care or to have
the mother withdraw from the labour market, while at the other extreme lone
mothers have fewer options and are much more likely to continue working. This
discussion leaves aside important issues of the quality of the care arrangements,
an area of continued research.
The third deals with labour market inequalities and the role of tax-transfer
programs. Left to their own, labour markets lead to roughly the same level of
income poverty in these two countries, though there is more a￿uence on average
in the United States and greater inequality. While the average Canadian child
is not as a￿uent as the average American, the poorest Canadian is not as poor
in an absolute sense as Americans at the bottom of the income distribution.
Public income transfers play a much more important role in reducing poverty
among Canadian children with virtually all families receiving some measure of
public support. This is likely the result of the Canadian Child Tax Bene￿t, a
progressive system of income transfers delivered through the income tax sys-
tem with the generosity of the bene￿t varying with family market income and
number of children. While this program has played a limited role in reducing
the incidence of low income, it has signi￿cantly reduced the severity of poverty.
This design contrasts with the Employment Income Tax Bene￿t in the United
States, which is tied to employment. All this said our analysis has not accounted
for the role of in-kind transfers in the United States, nor analysed the relative
merits of targeted in-kind support versus broad-based money transfers. These
alternative delivery mechanisms need to be evaluated not only in terms of the
level of support they o￿er, but once again with respect to more subtle issues of
43access, stigma, and take-up rates.
Finally, our analysis highlights but leaves unaddressed important details
concerning the quality and the variation in quality of public schooling. As sug-
gested the ￿nancing of public education is very di￿erent across these countries.
Education is a provincial responsibility in Canada, much in the way that the
States have primary responsibility in the United States. But the ￿nancial re-
sources available to schools are not linked to local property taxes, being tied
rather to the province-wide income tax. This permits a more equal allocation of
resources across municipalities and neighbourhoods than the United States, and
may contribute to a higher overall level of quality that is ultimately re￿ected in
the higher test score outcomes we document for Canadian children just before
their entry to high school.
It is important to re-emphasize that much of our analysis refers to a par-
ticular cohort of young people, those who were young teens at the turn of the
century and who will soon be coming of age as adults. Demographics, labour
markets, and public policy have all changed signi￿cantly over the course of the
last decade. These changes may have a bearing on how younger cohorts of
children will fare as adults. But given the con￿guration of these forces dur-
ing the period relevant for the cohort we study, essentially the 1990s and early
2000s, our analysis suggests that the next wave of intergenerational mobility
studies￿which will be based on this very group￿will likely ￿nd that the degree
of mobility continues to remain greater in Canada than in the United States.
All this said, to some measure the observation that Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) make in beginning their explanation for the much smaller size of the
welfare state in the United States compared to Europe also holds when the
comparison is made to Canada: ￿If one were born (and remained) at the bot-
tom end of the income distribution, one would be much better taken care of by
government policies in Europe than by those in the the United States.￿ (Alesina
and Glaeser 2004, page 2.) But their explanation for di￿erent levels of govern-
ment support is not so easily transposed to the Canadian context. ￿American
institutions [they argue] have strengthened the political right and given anti-
redistribution politicians the ability to push their world view￿and this world
view emphasizes economic opportunity. European institutions, to the contrary,
have empowered the left; as a result, leftist leaders have been able to indoctri-
nate Europeans with Marxist ideals about class solidarity and the capriciousness
of the capitalist system.￿ (page 12.)
This sharp dichotomy between values and institutions that pit equality of
opportunity against equality of outcomes does not resonate in a comparison in-
volving the United States and Canada. Our analysis has shown that Canadians
value equality of opportunity no more and no less than Americans, and they
have as much aversion for equality of outcomes. But Canadians have drawn the
balance between family and labour markets di￿erently than Americans￿using
in a pragmatic way the instruments available through public policy￿and for this
reason the tie between family background and the adult outcomes of children
will likely to continue to be looser in Canada for at least another generation.
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